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Zelenskiy: Anatomy of a success
Tadeusz Iwański
The political situation in Ukraine since the ‘revolution of dignity’ and the Russian aggression 
has created a specific social context in which the public’s perception of the traditional politi-
cians has started to deteriorate dramatically. The revolution awakened high public expecta-
tions of comprehensive reforms to the state, a new quality of governance, and the empower-
ment of society. However, 2014’s presidential and parliamentary elections led to only a minor 
turnover of the political elites, and the most important positions in the state were taken by 
politicians whose positions & ideas were formed in the 1990s when the oligarchic system in 
Ukraine was created. The reforms during the first two to three years after the revolution, 
which were mainly implemented under pressure from Western donors and civil society, failed 
to meet the public’s needs. Not only did they not lead to an improved quality of life, but they 
actually led to a decline and the emigration of around two million people, thus becoming 
an additional burden on the ‘old-new’ elite. Painful reforms, initiated but unfinished, and 
increasing political instability exacerbated the public’s already critical attitudes towards the 
political class. Just before the presidential elections, only 23% of respondents expressed trust 
in the president, 12% in parliament, 19% in the government, 12% in the courts, and 15% in the 
prosecutor’s office (poll by the Razumkov Centre in Kyiv).
The huge distrust of state institutions and politicians resulted in a search for ‘new faces’, peo-
ple from outside the establishment who were not disgraced, who were untainted by corrup-
tion and could meet the public’s diverse expectations. In the initial stage of the campaign, the 
Ukrainian people had a choice between two such people: Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, the leader of 
the popular rock band Okean Elzy, and Volodymyr Zelenskiy, the comedian and actor. Howev-
er, the former’s reluctance to announce his candidacy increased support for the latter, which 
only accelerated after Zelenskiy’s formal announcement at the turn of 2019 that he would run 
in the elections. In this way Zelenskiy become a major contender in the presidential race, and 
won the first round of elections.
Image and campaign
The most important source of Zelenskiy’s suc-
cess is his name recognition and popularity. 
Unlike most other potential ‘new faces’, for 
whom a media campaign would have been long 
and costly, Zelenskiy already enjoyed the favour 
of a significant proportion of Ukrainian voters 
when he announced he would run. He owes his 
popularity to performances in films, serials and 
satirical programmes over the last ten years and 
more. In addition, he has positive associations 
from TV productions like the Kvartal-95 cabaret 
show (which has been running since 2005) and 
the series Servant of the People (since 2015). 
He has played the lead in both shows, both of 
which refer to politics. The first ridicules the po-
litical situation, the ruling class and the reforms 
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they implement, while the second showcases 
an alternate reality. Zelenskiy plays the role of 
a modest history teacher who, by a twist of 
fate, becomes president of Ukraine and effec-
tively fights oligarchs and corrupt politicians 
in the defence of ordinary people’s interests. 
The show’s huge popularity (the biggest suc-
cess in the history of Ukrainian TV production) 
has not only increased Zelenskiy’s visibility but 
also habituated his audience to the lead charac-
ter’s political role. Moreover, in many people’s 
eyes he has become an apt commentator on 
political life, criticising the government’s hy-
pocrisy and double standards: they proclaim 
their adherence to European values, but keep 
resorting to blackmail and corruption; they pro-
claim an anti-Russian stance, while expanding 
their assets by smuggling from Russia and op-
erating factories there. Zelenskiy expresses the 
disappointment of society in the form of mock-
ery, thus channelling society’s fears and frustra-
tions. The third season of Servant of the People 
began in the week before the first round of the 
presidential elections.
It is not only Zelenskiy’s lack of political expe-
rience which works in his favour, but also his 
lack of coherent political views. Zelenskiy does 
not have to make any electoral promises, as he 
is commonly identified with the hero of his TV 
series. The illusion of a modest president who 
serves society and fights the pathologies of po-
litical and economic life, while at the same time 
approving the status quo without demanding 
any sacrifices associated with the reforms, has 
proved to be much more attractive than the 
image built up by the former prime minister 
Yulia Tymoshenko, of the defender of the poor 
against the oligarchs; or that of the incumbent 
president Petro Poroshenko, of the defender of 
the nation against the Russian threat.
Zelenskiy’s announcement that he would run in 
the elections, which took the form of a short film 
combined with his New Year’s greetings, kicked 
off his unusual campaign. He has mainly used 
social networks, interacting directly with voters 
during his cabaret concerts, using short video 
clips, polls and surveys, and commenting directly 
on political events. This approach has reinforced 
his image as a candidate from outside the sys-
tem. Zelenskiy has impressed the public with his 
naturalness, and has not tried too hard to hide 
his flaws. In fact, he has even emphasised them, 
trying to transform a weakness into a strength: 
when his opponents accused him of being 
a clown, his staff organised an internet cam-
paign entitled ‘We are all clowns’ that set the 
traditional politicians (not clowns) against Zelen-
skiy and his voters (the clowns).
Zelenskiy’s spontaneity contrasts with the trite 
quality of the campaigns run by Poroshenko, 
Tymoshenko and the pro-Russian candidate 
Yuri Boyko, which are based on geeky speech-
es, promises, and visits to cities and workplac-
es. Moreover, the actor has run a distinctly posi-
tive campaign: lacking a concrete manifesto, he 
has invited his followers to join in writing one, 
a move which has turned normal electoral log-
ic on its head by giving his voters a feeling of 
empowerment. He has offered them a form of 
joint action, instead of promises to act on their 
behalf. This approach binds him to his voters, 
giving the illusion of a horizontal relationship, 
of reducing the distance between the people 
and power, and of cooperation in place of sub-
ordination. Even if this has been unintention-
al, it both fits with the demands made on the 
Maidan, and resonates with the mood among 
many young people.
Zelenskiy has impressed the public with 
his naturalness, and has not tried to hide 
his flaws, transforming a weakness into 
a strength. 
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Target group
Zelenskiy’s campaign – which has been econom-
ical with its words and promises, and has built 
up the image of a man from outside politics, and 
who lacks any clear views on key issues – has 
allowed him to reach out effectively to differ-
ent social groups. The most important of these 
are the young and the middle-aged, who – re-
gardless of their differing political views – share 
a disaffection with the ossified ranks of Ukraine’s 
current politicians. Although a large portion of 
these voters would have been willing to support 
Svyatoslav Vakarchuk in the elections, after he 
chose not to run, they preferred to switch their 
votes to Zelenskiy, young and unblemished by 
politics, rather than the compromised figures of 
Poroshenko or Tymoshenko.
Zelenskiy has also managed to reach a group 
of more conservative voters who are tired of 
political instability, and who see the source of 
this chaos in the failed attempts to reform over 
recent years. During Zelenskiy’s election cam-
paign he did not promise to make any further 
fundamental changes, and limited his rhetoric to 
empty populist slogans about the need to fight 
corruption and raise living standards. In terms 
of foreign policy, he has used plenty of uncon-
troversial (and unfulfillable) slogans about the 
need for Ukraine to join Euro-Atlantic structures, 
and has called Russia’s actions in Crimea and the 
Donbas annexation and aggression. He has spo-
ken about the development of the state and re-
forms in such a threadbare and general manner 
that he has managed to attract both people who 
want to halt the reforms, and those who want to 
accelerate them and hope that a man from out-
side the establishment will break up the old sys-
tem. The invitations to well-known reformers like 
the Lithuanian economist Aivaras Abromavičius 
and Ukraine’s former finance minister (2016-18) 
Oleksandr Danyluk to join his campaign team 
were a signal to the latter group.
Last but not least, Zelenskiy has won the trust 
of those voters who see the actions of the 
president and the government in the cultural 
and symbolic sphere as a threat to their iden-
tity. This is because for many people, the actor 
embodies a different model of patriotism than 
the one promoted by the current government, 
which is based on The Ukrainisation of the pub-
lic sphere and anti-Russian rhetoric. Despite 
the increase of patriotic and anti-Russian senti-
ments in Ukraine, there is still a group in society 
which does not agree with the state’s histor-
ical policy. These are people attached to Rus-
sian culture and language, and who often (like 
Zelenskiy himself) use it as their primary vehicle 
of expression, regardless of the war with Russia 
in the Donbas and the annexation of Crimea. 
This group – who are still quite large in Ukraine, 
and live mostly in the east and south of the 
country (where the actor himself comes from) 
– feels no less patriotic than their fellow citi-
zens from other regions who speak Ukrainian 
and are more Western-oriented. However, due 
to the policies of Ukrainisation and de-Com-
munisation in public life, and the general right-
ward shift in Ukrainian politics, some of them 
feel marginalised at best, or even stigmatised 
as a kind of Russian fifth column. Zelenskiy, 
as a popular, successful man who appeals to 
Soviet-Russian symbols, not only legitimises 
their views and values, but has de facto be-
come their spokesman and protector.
Forecast
To a significant proportion of the electorate, 
Zelenskiy appears as the ideal centrist candi-
date: young, modern, not involved in corrup-
tion scandals, not burdened with ideology, who 
represents a better promise of change in the 
Zelenskiy’s manifesto is very threadbare 
and general, so it will not alienate people 
who want to halt the reforms or those who 
want to accelerate them, hoping he will 
break up the old system.
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country than the old political class. The run-off 
with Poroshenko will not be the battle between 
pro-Russian and pro-Western politicians which 
had been traditional for Ukraine until 2014; it 
will be a competition between a politician and 
a post-politician. The incumbent president will 
seek to set up the campaign before the second 
round as a clash between professionalism and 
ignorance, and he will continue his aggressive 
negative campaign, based on accusing his rival 
of real or imagined ties to Russia, and dividing 
Ukrainian society into good and bad citizens. 
This strategy, although natural and well-re-
hearsed before the first round, will not win him 
the votes for other candidates, especially as 
(according to the polls) large sections of both 
Tymoshenko’s and Boyko’s voters have said 
they will vote for the comedian.
The first round of the elections showed that 
a positive campaign which promotes unity, 
not division, brought Zelenskiy his success (he 
won 19 of the country’s 24 regions). If Poro-
shenko’s staff cannot move beyond the cur-
rent logic of their campaign, and if no credible 
material seriously compromising Zelenskiy’s 
integrity and/or morality emerges, society’s 
anger towards the old political elite may over-
come its fear of entrusting the highest office 
in the country to a comedian with no political 
experience.
BIOGRAPHY
Volodymyr Zelenskiy was born in 1978 in 
Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk region) into a fami-
ly of the Russian-speaking Jewish intelligentsia, 
the only son of Oleksandr and Rimma. His fa-
ther is a trained mathematician in cybernetics 
(his doctorate comes from the Moscow State 
Mining University), and head of the Department 
of Computer Science and Applied Programming 
in the Kryvyi Rih Economic Institute (a branch of 
the Vadym Hetman National Economic Univer-
sity in Kyiv). His mother is an engineer by train-
ing, now retired.
Zelenskiy studied law at the Kryvyi Rih Econom-
ics Institute, but never entered the profession. 
According to available information he has never 
served in the army. He married Olena Kiyashko 
(b. 1978), a friend from high school who gradu-
ated in architecture from the Kryvyi Rih Econom-
ics Institute. They have two children, Oleksandr 
(b. 2004) and Kyryl (b. 2013). His wife is his artis-
tic collaborator, a co-owner of part of his prop-
erty, and a writer for television and cabaret.
Zelenskiy took his first steps in performing 
while still in middle school, joining a theatre 
group and the school’s musical ensemble. Dur-
ing his studies he started working as a danc-
er in the Zaporozhye-Krivoy Rog-Transit caba-
ret group. In 1997, he and his friends founded 
their own cabaret Kvartal-95, in which he still 
performs today. Two years later the group was 
invited to perform on KVN’s Premier League, 
a very popular cabaret programme on Rus-
sian television, and began performing in many 
post-Soviet countries. During this time Zelens-
kiy lived in Russia for six years. In 2003, af-
ter a conflict with the programme’s producers, 
he and his group returned to Ukraine full-time, 
where he continued his activity and began his 
career as a comic actor. After 2003 his group 
gained wide popularity through its appearanc-
es on the 1+1 TV channel owned by Ihor Kol-
omoyskiy. In 2005, he signed a contract with 
the Inter TV channel owned by Valeriy Khoro-
shkovskiy, who at that time had close ties with 
Viktor Yanukovych. Kvartal-95’s formula for TV 
cabaret quickly became one of the most pop-
ular entertainment programmes on Ukrainian 
television.
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Zelenskiy gained great popularity for his perfor-
mance and eventual victory in the Ukrainian 
version of Dancing with the Stars in 2006. 
At the same time he expanded his business 
in the entertainment industry, and together 
with his friends from college Boris and Serhiy 
Shefir, they founded the Studio Kvartal-95 
company, which has been responsible for the 
group’s further productions as well as satirical 
programmes, comedy films, musicals and pri-
vate cabaret performances. In 2010-12, he was 
the main producer for Inter TV, and hosted 
its entertainment programmes. According to 
Ukrainian media, at the time some of the shares 
in Studio Kvartal-95 were owned by Valeriy 
Khoroshkovskiy, who was both the owner of 
Inter and the head of the Ukrainian Securi-
ty Service from 2010 to 2012. Zelenskiy has 
worked with many producers and artists 
in Russia, regularly appearing on Russian tel-
evision alongside Filipp Kirkorov, a star of the 
Russian stage. As a media and show-business 
entrepreneur, the co-creator of cabaret pro-
grammes and comedy films, he has achieved 
spectacular success, including financially. 
The entertainment programmes and films pro-
duced by Studio Kvartal-95 (which are recorded 
almost exclusively in Russian) are also very pop-
ular in Russia itself (it was their main market un-
til 2014) and many other post-Soviet countries.
In 2012, Studio Kvartal-95 Quarter ceased its 
cooperation with Inter (apparently because 
they were pressured not to criticise President 
Yanukovych), and its productions returned 
to the 1+1 TV channel. In 2015, they aired 
the first season of the TV series Servant of the 
People, which told the story of a history teach-
er who was elected president of Ukraine by 
chance. The series became extremely popular, 
with a peak audience of 20 million TV viewers, 
and it was recommissioned for a further two 
seasons, the last of which was shown just be-
fore the first round of the presidential elections 
in March 2019.
The nature of Zelenskiy’s relationship with 
the oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskiy remains un-
clear. Zelenskiy is seen by his political oppo-
nents and most commentators as a ‘puppet’ of 
the oligarch. It is known that in recent years he 
has attended Kolomoyskiy’s birthday parties, 
and that his team includes people who have 
worked for the oligarch (including his former 
lawyer Andriy Bohdan, now a member of Zelen-
skiy’s election team). However, the assertion 
that the oligarch controls Zelenskiy seems to be 
an exaggeration. Zelenskiy himself has played 
down the accusations, claiming that he is only 
Kolomoyskiy’s partner in the television busi-
ness. Although the majority of Zelenskiy’s pro-
ductions since 2012 have been shown on 1+1 
television, it is difficult to say that the actor is 
financially dependent on the oligarch – rather, 
they are in a mutually beneficial relationship,
Zelenskiy declared his support for the dem-
onstrators on the Maidan back in December 
2013. After the annexation of Crimea and the 
Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine, Studio 
Kvartal-95 broke off its cooperation with its 
Russian partners. Members of Kvartal-95 have 
given special shows for Ukrainian soldiers and 
joined in collecting gifts for the volunteer bat-
talions.
In December 2017, Zelenskiy and his childhood 
friend Ivan Bakanov founded the Servant of 
the People political party. As was explained at 
the time, the group was created on the basis of 
the already existing Party for Decisive Change, 
because the show’s name had to be secured 
before it could be politically exploited by out-
siders. However, as it increased its support in 
successive opinion polls, this formerly marginal 
party began to be seen as a real political pro-
ject. Zelenskiy began to be mentioned as a pos-
sible presidential candidate from mid-2018. His 
first polls showed support for him at the level 
of 5-6%, and he officially announced he was 
running on 31 December 2018.
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Although Volodymyr Zelenskiy is very often 
labelled as a ‘comedian’, in fact he has been 
a leading figure in the Ukrainian entertain-
ment industry for many years, as a share-
holder in companies involved in the production 
of films and television series which have been 
broadcast throughout the post-Soviet area. In 
2013, the Ukrainian edition of Forbes put him 
top of the 25 richest celebrities and sports stars 
in Ukraine, and in 2010 the weekly Focus placed 
him fifth on the list of the most bankable show-
business stars. The actual value of Zelenskiy’s 
assets is difficult to assess, although esti-
mates range around the US$10m mark. From 
the declaration of assets which he submitted 
while registering as a presidential candidate, it 
appears that he owns several apartments and 
houses (including in Crimea and the UK), and 
holds shares in 20 companies (including Studio 
Kvartal-95, the ‘League of Laughter’ Produc-
tion Centre and Kvartal-Kontsert), including 
one registered in Italy and four more in tax ha-
vens. Until recently he owned shares in the Cy-
prus-based Green Family, which owned Russian 
companies involved in television production. 
Following the disclosure of this information by 
investigative journalists, the actor stated that 
he had withdrawn from the company.
In his public statements Zelenskiy has been 
using the Ukrainian language increasingly of-
ten, although he does not speak the language 
fluently. From his few statements on the mat-
ter, it appears that (if he becomes president) he 
will use the Ukrainian language in public, which, 
like English, he is currently learning intensively. 
At the same time, his electoral staff are scepti-
cal of the new language law currently passing 
through parliament which aims to expand the 
use of Ukrainian; they consider it a factor which 
encourages divisions rather than uniting society. 
Zelenskiy comes from a secular family, and it is 
not known whether he is religious.
Zelenskiy’s attitude towards the West re-
mains ambiguous. On the one hand, he pre-
sents himself as a supporter of Ukrainian soci-
ety’s pro-European aspirations as expressed in 
its pursuit of Western living standards and the 
adoption of Western democratic standards. On 
the other hand, in a recent interview he said 
that “nobody in the EU is waiting for Ukraine”, 
and that he “does not understand what NATO 
is.” Moreover, his cabaret performances reveal 
his scepticism of Western structures. Yet in his 
manifesto he has mentioned Ukraine’s desire 
for membership of NATO and the EU.
Zelenskiy’s ideas on how relations with Rus-
sia should develop are similarly vague. His 
clearly expressed patriotic attitude shortly after 
the Russian aggression contrasts with his public 
statements during the election campaign. Be-
fore announcing that he would run in the elec-
tions, he argued that the conflict could be ended 
if he met Vladimir Putin personally and came to 
terms with the Russian side. After a wave of crit-
icism, this position was altered; when the results 
from the first round of the election were issued, 
he announced that a meeting with Putin would 
only be possible after Crimea and the Donbas 
are returned, and compensation for war losses is 
paid. He continues to emphasise that the hostili-
ties must be halted and the bloodshed ended as 
soon as possible, which – considering his failure 
to offer any ideas on how to bring this about – 
seems to be an attitude targeted at meeting the 
expectations of a society which is tired of the 
long-lasting conflict.
Publicly he presents himself as an ‘easy-going’ 
person who avoids severe or unambiguous po-
litical declarations. His views on many impor-
tant issues remain unclear. Neither Zelenskiy 
nor his staff have made any comment on 
historical topics. These issues do not appear in 
the candidate’s manifesto, which suggests that 
they do not have any great importance for him. 
It can be assumed that Zelenskiy – who comes 
from a Russian-speaking family in southern 
Ukraine – does not support a historical policy 
of the kind currently being conducted by the 
Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance.
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During the election campaign Zelenskiy did not 
mention Poland, either in the context of ex-
panding the so-called Normandy format or of 
bilateral relations. In his official documents Po-
land has been mentioned once, in a humorous 
tone in the manifesto which the candidate was 
required to submit to the Central Election Com-
mission. In this document, Zelenskiy declared 
that the Ukraine of his dreams is a country to 
which Polish people will emigrate for work, and 
to which Ukrainian workers will return from Po-
land. The available information suggests that 
the candidate’s team has a generally positive 
attitude towards Poland, but lacks an explicit 
vision for the future relationship.
